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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Charles and Patricia Geiger never thought they would have to spend a night in 
jail, but on March 1, 2011 that is exactly what happened.1  The couple was arrested 
and Charles charged with felonious assault from a hit and run incident with an off-
duty Cleveland Police officer.2  The incident occurred when the officer approached 
an SUV that had made an illegal U-turn; the SUV responded by speeding off, hitting 
and injuring the officer.3  The Geigers were questioned and eventually arrested based 
on the officer’s eyewitness identification of Mr. Geiger as the driver and his 
statement that the license plate number of the vehicle involved matched that of the 
Geigers’.4  Based on this evidence, the couple was arrested that evening of March 1, 
2011 and spent over twenty hours in jail before finally being released on bail.5  The 
only problem is, at the time of the incident, neither of the Geigers were in the area.6  
Charles Geiger was eating dinner at a local restaurant with his daughter, an event 
                                                           
 1 Leila Atassi, Still No Apology for Lakewood Couple After 20 Hours in Jail for Crime 
They Did Not Commit, PLAIN DEALER (Apr. 20, 2011, 12:10 PM), 
http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2011/04/still_no_apology_for_lakewood.html.  
 2 Michael Sangiacomo, Former Lakewood School Board Member Accused of Assaulting 
a Cleveland Police Officer, PLAIN DEALER (Mar. 4, 2011, 9:58 PM), 
http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2011/03/former_lakewood_school_board_m.html. 
 3 Atassi, supra note 1. 
 4 Id.  
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
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that was captured on a security camera.7  Multiple witnesses swore that Mrs. 
Geiger’s SUV was not in the officer’s vicinity that evening.8  After this evidence 
came to light, the police stopped their investigation and the Prosecutor’s Office 
moved to dismiss the pending charges against Charles Geiger.9  
Because their ordeal occurred before July 1, 2011, the Geigers’ nightmare ended 
with nothing more than bad memories and residual animosity over their unfortunate 
time in jail.10  Under Ohio’s new felony-arrestee DNA statute, however, the Geigers’ 
ordeal would not have ended with dismissal of the charges.11  Instead, during the 
booking process, Mr. Geiger would have been required to submit to a DNA 
collection procedure and his DNA specimen would have been added to the state’s 
DNA database.12  Once his DNA profile was in the database, it would be subject to 
almost unlimited searches, and the only recourse available to Mr. Geiger would be 
the pursuit of a lengthy record sealing process.13  The bottom line is, because of the 
arresting police department’s error, the government would permanently retain 
Geiger’s DNA sample.14  The Geigers’ case is sadly not unique, as tens of thousands 
of Ohio’s over 300,000 annual felony arrestees will never be convicted.15 
                                                           
 7 See Leila Atassi, Surveillance Video that Cleared Geiger, PLAIN DEALER (Apr. 8, 2011, 
4:35 PM), http://videos.cleveland.com/plain-dealer/2011/04/surveillance_video_that_cleare. 
html. 
 8 Atassi, supra note 1. 
 9 Id. 
 10 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012).  July 1, 2011 is when the felony-
arrestee portion of the statute took effect.  
 11 Id.  
 12 Id.  Mrs. Geiger was charged with obstructing justice which, under current Ohio law, is 
a misdemeanor.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.32 (LexisNexis 2013).  Therefore, during her 
booking process, she would not have been required to submit to a DNA specimen collection 
procedure. 
 13 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.52 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 14 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 15 In 2009, Ohio reported 302,529 arrests for violent and property crimes to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., OHIO DEP’T OF PUB. 
SAFETY, OHIO CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 32 (2010).  The FBI also estimates the total 
number of such crimes in Ohio, with the estimates for the last 10 years never dipping below 
400,000. Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/State/RunCrimeStatebyState.cfm (select “Ohio” for 
part (a); “Number of violent crimes” and “Number of property crimes” for part (b); and “2000 
to 2010” for part (c); then select “Get Table” button).  Ohio does not keep statistics of the 
disposition of felony arrests, but in states such as California, where such statistics are kept, the 
conviction rate varied from 67.5 to 71.0 percent. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL., ADULT FELONY 
ARREST DISPOSITIONS 2000-2005 (2006), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/publications 
/candd/cd05/tabs/2005Table39.pdf.  A study of New York City’s arrests and dispositions 
found that over 40 percent of those arrested were never prosecuted.  VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, 
FELONY ARRESTS: THEIR PROSECUTION AND DISPOSITION IN NEW YORK CITY’S COURTS 
(Malcolm Feeley ed., rev. ed. 1980). 
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Increasing law enforcement’s ability to obtain DNA evidence is one of the recent 
trends in legislation across the country.16  The importance of DNA evidence in 
solving crimes has led to a nationwide increase in felony-arrestee DNA statutes.17  
Felony-arrestee DNA statutes require the arresting law enforcement agency to take a 
DNA sample from every person arrested for a felony as part of the booking 
procedure.18  Ohio has recently joined this national trend, and in an attempt to 
increase the number of samples in its DNA database, has authorized the collection of 
DNA from all felony arrestees.19 
This Note argues that Ohio’s felony-arrestee DNA statute violates Article I, 
section 14 of the Ohio Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.20  The initial physical swab and the subsequent database searches of an 
arrestee’s DNA sample, while the arrestee is in custody or being prosecuted, do not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.21  However, the inclusion of an innocent person’s 
DNA in Ohio’s DNA database, subject to repeated searches over time, violates both 
the Ohio and federal constitutional protections against unreasonable searches.22  
Broadly written DNA statutes trample people’s civil rights, and more carefully 
drawn legislation could meet the same law enforcement goals.23  The legislature 
should revise Ohio’s felony-arrestee statute, balancing law enforcement’s interest in 
solving crimes with the civil liberties of arrestees. 
Part II of this Note explains the background of the Ohio DNA statute and the 
broader nationwide trend of statutes designed to increase DNA databases.  Part III 
explores the relevant precedents and the protections available under the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.  Part IV 
shows that under the Ohio Supreme Court’s current understanding of Article I, § 14 
and the Fourth Amendment, the felony-arrestee statute is unconstitutional.  Part V 
proposes a revision of the statute that both cures the law of its constitutional defects 
and provides law enforcement officials with a constitutional and effective way to 
                                                           
 16 2011 DNA Database Legislation, DNARESOURCE.COM (Jan. 21, 2012), http://www. 
cqstatetrack.com/texis/viewrpt/main.html?event=495bdbf6ba. 
 17 DNARESOURCE.COM, STATE THAT HAVE PASSED ARRESTEE DNA DATABASE LAWS 
(Sept. 2011), available at http://www.dnaresource.com/documents/ArresteeDNALaws-
2011.pdf (sic). 
 18 The moniker “felony-arrestee” refers generally to statutes requiring all felony arrestees, 
instead of those requiring samples from specific offenders, all arrestees, or convicted felons.  
See Ashley Eiler, Arrested Development: Reforming the Federal All-Arrestee DNA Collection 
Statute to Comply with the Fourth Amendment, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1201, 1206-07 
(2011) (discussing the growth in felony arrestee statutes); Robert Berlet, A Step Too Far: Due 
Process and DNA Collection in California After Proposition 69, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1481, 1494-95 (2007) (explaining the expansion of California’s DNA sampling from a few 
specific felonies to any felony arrestee). 
 19 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 20 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 14; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 21 See infra Part III.B. 
 22 See infra Part III.B.  
 23 42 U.S.C.S. § 14135 (LexisNexis 2012) (federal statute providing funding to states to 
update DNA statutes). 
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increase Ohio’s DNA database while safeguarding the rights of innocent Ohio 
citizens. 
II.  DNA STATUTES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
On July 1, 2011, Ohio joined twelve other states that currently take DNA 
samples from all felony arrestees.24  With the passage of Senate Bill (SB) 77 in July 
2010, the Ohio legislature revised the DNA collection statute to require that the 
arresting law enforcement agency take a DNA sample from all felony arrestees over 
the age of eighteen.25  
Ohio created a DNA database in 1995.26  Since its creation, the database has been 
expanded to include DNA samples from juvenile offenders, convicted felons, sex 
offenders, and some violent felony offenders.27  Under current Ohio law, the 
arresting law enforcement agency is required to take a DNA sample from all felony 
arrestees as part of the booking procedure.28  These samples are processed into 
profiles and turned over to the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation 
(BCII) to be added to Ohio’s DNA database.29  The profiles and samples will be 
retained and subject to repeated comparisons with future samples from crime scenes 
or other subjects as part of an investigation.30 
                                                           
 24 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2012); ALA. CODE § 36-18-25 
(LexisNexis 2012); ALASKA STAT. § 44.41.035 (2013); CAL. PENAL CODE § 296.1 (Deering 
2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-23-103 (2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325 (LexisNexis 2013); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2511 (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:609 (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 29-3-10 (LexisNexis 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-13-03 (2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-
620 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5A-5 (2012) (stating “[a]ny person who is convicted or 
adjudicated delinquent for a qualifying offense,” where all qualifying offenses are defined in § 
23-5A-1); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1933 (2013). 
 25 S.B. 77, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2010).  The new statutory language 
reads: 
On and after July 1, 2011, a person who is eighteen years of age or older and who is 
arrested on or after July 1, 2011, for a felony offense shall submit to a DNA specimen 
collection procedure administered by the head of the arresting law enforcement 
agency.  The head of the arresting law enforcement agency shall cause the DNA 
specimen to be collected from the person during the intake process at the jail, 
community-based correctional facility, detention facility or law enforcement agency 
office or station to which the arrested person is taken after the arrest. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2012).  
 26 S.B. 5, 121st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1995) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 109.573 (LexisNexis 2012)). 
 27 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 109.573, 313.08, 2152.74, 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012). 
(dealing with the collection of DNA specimens, but for this Note the focus will be on the 
felony-arrestee DNA statute in § 2901.07). 
 28 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2012). 
 29 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 30 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.573 (LexisNexis 2012). 
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All fifty states and the federal government have some sort of DNA database.31  
All of the databases include samples from convicted offenders and those on 
probation.32  Exactly half of the states take samples from murder arrestees and those 
arrested for sex crimes.33  A majority of states include juvenile offenders’ samples in 
a database.34   
The addition of each of these groups to the DNA databases was not without legal 
challenges.35  Although the United States Supreme Court has never ruled on the 
constitutionality of these additions, the federal circuit courts have upheld the federal 
DNA statute’s requirement of sampling from convicted offenders and parolees.36  
State courts have also generally found post-conviction DNA sampling to be 
constitutional.37  Ohio is no exception, and the Ohio courts have upheld the additions 
of DNA samples from convicted offenders and juvenile offenders.38 
The success of DNA evidence has resulted in a push for new legislation to 
expand the number of samples included in databases.39  A great deal of the 
legislation deals with the administration of growing databases.40  In 2011, five states 
proposed new legislation requiring samples from all felony arrestees, while another 
six states proposed legislation expanding the number of qualifying offenses that 
require a DNA sample.41  The proliferation of DNA databases and the increase of 
                                                           
 31 “All fifty states have enacted DNA database statutes and courts have almost uniformly 
held that they do not violate the Fourth Amendment.”  State v. Steele, 802 N.E.2d 1127, 1133 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (citing Gaines v. State, 998 P.2d 166 (Nev. 2000)); Doles v. State, 994 
P.2d 315, 318 (Wyo. 1999); Landry v. Att’y. Gen., 709 N.E.2d 1085 (Mass. 1999). 
 32 DNARESOURCE.COM, STATE DNA DATABASE LAWS QUALIFYING OFFENSES (Sept. 
2011), available at http://www.dnaresource.com/documents/statequalifyingoffenses 2011.pdf. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 See, e.g., United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2007).  
 36 See, e.g., United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2007); Nicholas v. Goord, 430 
F.3d 652 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674 (6th Cir. 2006); United States 
v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc); Banks v. United States, 490 
F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 37 See, e.g., State v. Norman, 660 N.W.2d 549 (N.D. 2003).  
 38 In re Nicholson, 724 N.E.2d 1217, 1221 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the taking 
of a juvenile offender’s DNA does not violate the Fourth Amendment); State v. Steele, 802 
N.E.2d 1127, 1137 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the taking of a blood sample from a 
convict without individualized suspicion did not violate the Fourth Amendment under the 
special needs test). 
 39 See, e.g., S.B. 268, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (amending OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2901.07 to require that persons indicted for a felony submit to DNA collection 
procedures when they are arraigned, and requiring courts to order those persons either arrested 
or indicted for a felony who did not submit to a DNA collection procedure to do so).  
 40 2009 Miscellaneous DNA Legislation, DNARESOURCE.COM (Jan. 21, 2012), 
http://www.cqstatetrack.com/texis/viewrpt/main.html?event=495bd5e512a. 
 41 West Virginia, Mississippi, Iowa, Georgia, and Connecticut have proposed sampling 
from all felony arrestees, while New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Indiana, Illinois, and 
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legislation allowing the taking of DNA samples without a warrant or individualized 
suspicion have led to inevitable court challenges.42  On July 30, 2012, the United 
States Supreme Court stayed the decision in King v. State, a Maryland Court of 
Appeals decision holding Maryland’s felony-arrestee statute unconstitutional.43  On 
November 9, 2012, the Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari, and oral 
arguments were held February 26, 2013.44 
Ohio courts will likely have to determine whether Ohio’s statute conforms to the 
Ohio Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  
This Note describes why Ohio courts should find the statute unconstitutional, and 
encourages the Ohio legislature to adopt a solution that balances law enforcement’s 
interest in effectively solving crime with a person’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy. 
A.  The Fourth Amendment, Article I, § 14, and DNA Samples as Searches 
1.  The Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 14 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects people from 
government intrusions that amount to unreasonable searches and seizures.45  The 
modern understanding of the protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment is 
based on whether or not the intrusion violates the subject’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy.46  The test for reasonableness has two parts: (1) the individual has a 
subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) the expectation is recognized as 
objectively reasonable by society.47  The Ohio Supreme Court has determined that 
                                                           
Hawaii have legislation expanding the number of qualifying offenses.  2011 DNA Database 
Legislation, DNARESOURCE.COM (Jan. 21, 2012), http://www.cqstatetrack.com/texis 
/viewrpt/main.html?event=495bdbf6ba.  
 42 For federal circuit courts, see Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (N.D. Cal. 2009), 
aff’d sub nom. Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Pool, 621 
F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Frank, No. CR-09-2075-EFS-1, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 32542, at *1 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 1, 2010); United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (en banc); United States v. Thomas, No. 10-CR-6172CJS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
45333 (W.D.N.Y Feb. 14, 2011).  For state court cases, see In re Welfare of C.T.L., 722 
N.W.2d 484 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702 (Va. 2007); 
People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review granted by 262 
P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011). 
 43 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1 (2012). 
 44 King v. State, 42 A.3d 549 (Md. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012). 
 45 U.S. CONST. amend. IV states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
 46 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 47 Id. 
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Article I, section 14 of the Ohio Constitution does not provide any further 
protections than what is provided under the Fourth Amendment.48  
The protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment and the Ohio Constitution 
only apply to government intrusions that amount to searches or seizures.49  Arrestee 
DNA statutes involve a two-part search.50  The first is the physical bodily intrusion 
to collect the actual DNA sample.51  The second is an informational search when the 
DNA profile is created, added to the DNA database, and compared to other DNA 
samples.52  It is on this second part that courts focus their analysis when determining 
the constitutionality of arrestee DNA statutes.53 
2.  Ohio’s DNA Statute: Multiple and Potentially Endless Searches 
Arrestee DNA statutes create a scheme that requires multiple searches.54  Under 
Ohio’s statutory scheme, the taking of a DNA sample by law enforcement happens 
as part of the booking procedure.55  The arresting law enforcement agency takes a 
sample by buccal swab and sends it to the BCII.56  The sample is then analyzed and 
compared to the current collection of samples in the DNA database.57  The sample 
will also be added to the DNA database for comparison to samples collected in the 
future.58  
                                                           
 48 State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762, 766-67 (Ohio 1997).  This is not a surprising 
decision, as Article I, section 14 of the Ohio Constitution differs from the Fourth Amendment 
by only one word. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the person and things to be seized. 
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 14. 
 49 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 14. 
 50 See, e.g., People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 760 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for 
review granted by 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011) (“The collection of the DNA sample, however, is 
only the first part of the search authorized by the DNA Act; the second occurs when the DNA 
sample is analyzed and a profile created for use in state and federal DNA databases.”). 
 51 Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 760 (“Courts have routinely held that the collection of DNA 
by means of a blood test is a minimal intrusion into an individual’s privacy interest in bodily 
integrity.”). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. (“The latter search is the true focus of our analysis and the analyses of other courts 
that have considered the validity of the DNA statutes.”). 
 54 Eiler, supra note 18, at 1209. 
 55 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 56 A buccal swab is the use of a cotton-tipped applicator to collect cheek cells from the 
inside of the subject’s mouth, which is a good source of DNA.  Questions & Answers About 
Buccal Swabs, NAT’L MARROW DONOR PROGRAM (Mar. 16, 2006), http://www.lssu.edu/ 
campuslife/documents/buccal_swab_qa_032306.pdf. 
 57 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 58 Id. 
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The United States Supreme Court has held that the forcible compulsion to collect 
blood samples is a search under the Fourth Amendment.59  The taking of a breath 
sample is also a search.60  The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that bodily intrusions 
for “blood, breath and urine testing ‘must be deemed Fourth Amendment 
searches.’”61  The taking of a buccal swab is arguably less intrusive than the taking 
of a blood sample on the spectrum of bodily intrusions, but is more intrusive than 
administering a breath test.62  Although the issue of buccal cheek swabs as searches 
has never been decided in Ohio, the weight of commentators, other courts, and 
precedent as to other search methods strongly points to the conclusion that it would 
also be considered a search.63 
In addition to the initial swab search, a second search occurs each time a new 
DNA profile is created and compared to the existing DNA profiles in the database.64  
An individual has an objectively reasonable privacy interest in the genetic 
information that each profile contains.65  The information that can be gleaned from 
one’s DNA profile includes information about diseases and propensity for certain 
behavioral traits, and can even reveal private information about the individual’s 
genetically-related family members.66  Society has an objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy in DNA samples, because by its very nature an individual’s 
sample reveals a wealth of information about other individuals not legally included 
in the DNA database.67 
                                                           
 59 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). 
 60 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989). 
 61 State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Comp., 780 N.E.2d 981, 986 
(Ohio 2002) (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618). 
 62 Eiler, supra note 18, at 1210. 
 63 Id.; People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 760 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review 
granted by 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011); Ohio AFL-CIO, 780 N.E.2d at 986. 
 64 Eiler, supra note 18, at 1209 (arguing that the federal statute creates “three distinct 
phases that constitute searches under the Fourth Amendment”). 
 65 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 865-66 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Reinhardt J., 
dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s reliance on the physical intrusion rather than considering 
the information obtained from the search). 
 66 Id.; see also D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 455, 481-82 (2001); Tracey Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee’s DNA a 
Valid Special Needs Search Under the Fourth Amendment? What Should (and Will) the 
Supreme Court Do?, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 165, 169-170 (2006).   In fact, states have begun 
to recognize what potentially valuable resources partial matches based on familial 
relationships are.  See, e.g., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DNA PARTICLE MATCH (CRIME SCENE 
DNA PROFILE TO OFFENDER) POLICY (Apr. 1999), available at http://www.dnaresource.com/ 
documents/CAfamilialpolicy.pdf. 
 67 Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to Catch 
Offender’s Kin, 34 J.L. MED & ETHICS 248, 249 (2006).  The federal database attempts to 
remedy this issue by only including “junk DNA” profiles which are intended to limit the 
amount of personal information available while still being able to uniquely identify a 
particular person.  However, junk DNA can already yield evidence of a person’s race, sex, 
geographic or ethic origins, genetic family relationships, and is believed to contain a wealth of 
information relating to one’s personal behavioral traits and medical information.  Eiler, supra 
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The structure of the DNA statute creates the possibility that exonerated or 
innocent people would be subject to repetitive privacy intrusions over the course of 
their lifetime and beyond, merely for having the misfortune of participating in the 
standard booking procedure of Ohio.68 
B.  Totality of the Circumstances vs. Special Needs Doctrine 
1.  The Totality of the Circumstances Test and Post Conviction DNA Statutes 
Federal and state courts have almost unanimously upheld the taking of DNA 
samples from convicted felons and parolees.69 Courts upholding the sampling of 
convicted offenders and parolees have differed on the correct test to apply.  Some 
courts apply the totality of the circumstances test, while others apply the special 
needs exception.70  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals is unique in that it determined 
that the federal post-conviction DNA statute satisfied both tests, and thus, it will be 
the focus of this discussion.71 
The totality of the circumstances test is a balancing test that the Supreme Court 
has applied to determine the validity of warrantless searches under the Fourth 
Amendment.72  The reasoning behind the totality of the circumstances test is based 
                                                           
note 18, at 1211-12; Jennifer K. Wagner, Out with the “Junk DNA” Phrase, 58 J. FORENSIC 
SCI. 1 (2012); Simon A. Cole, Is the “Junk” DNA Designation Bunk?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 54, 57 (2007), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/ 
Colloquy/2007/23/LRColl2007n23Cole.pdf; Justin Gillis, Genetic Code of Mouse Published; 
Comparison with Human Genome Indicates “Junk DNA” May be Vital, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 
2002, at A1.  See W. Wayt Gibbs, The Unseen Genome: Gems Among the Junk, 289 SCI. AM. 
46 (2003), for a more detailed discussion of junk DNA. 
 68 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 69 Twelve federal circuit courts that have heard cases dealing with post conviction DNA 
statutes have upheld them as constitutional.  United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 
2007); United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 679-81 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924-25 (8th Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 498 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006); Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 666 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Sczubelek, 
402 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2005); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 832 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc); Green v. Berge, 354 
F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir. 2004); Groceman v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413 (5th Cir. 
2004); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003); Jones v. Murray, 962 
F.2d 302, 305 (4th Cir. 1992).  State courts, including Ohio, have also upheld post-conviction 
DNA statutes.  See, e.g., State v. Steele, 802 N.E.2d 1127 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). 
 70 See Conley, 453 F.3d at 679, 681 (upholding the taking of a probationer’s DNA under 
both the special needs doctrine and the totality of the circumstances approach); see also 
Kincade, 379 F.3d at 832 (applying the totality of the circumstances test); Goord, 430 F.3d at 
667 (applying the special needs doctrine). 
 71 Conley, 453 F.3d at 679, 681. 
 72 The balancing test first appeared in Camera v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 
523, 536-537 (1967) (stating that a balancing test is the best way to determine if a search is 
reasonable).  For the test applied to warrantless criminal searches, see United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-22 (2001) (upholding the warrantless search of a probationer’s 
home when law enforcement suspected that probationer was involved in arson-related crimes 
because the state’s interest in searching the home outweighed the probationer’s diminished 
expectation of privacy) and Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852-53 (2006) (upholding 
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on the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.73  The court weighs 
the person’s reasonable expectation of privacy and the intrusiveness of the 
government’s incursion against the legitimate government interest in effective law 
enforcement.74 
A number of state and federal courts have applied this test to statutes requiring a 
DNA sample from convicted felons or those on supervised release.75  In making this 
determination, one factor in particular the courts have relied on is that offenders have 
a lower expectation of privacy than innocent individuals.76  The courts then weigh 
the offender’s lowered expectation of privacy and the minimally intrusive nature of 
the sampling against the government’s interest in solving future crimes.77  
In United States v. Conley, the Sixth Circuit applied the totality of the 
circumstances test in upholding the federal post-conviction DNA statutes as applied 
to a parolee.78  The court first rejected the petitioner’s assertion that the statute was 
unconstitutional because the Fourth Amendment required some individualized 
suspicion for a warrantless search.79  The court determined that individualized 
suspicion was not required for a search to be reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.80  The court reasoned that as a probationer, the petitioner had a “greatly 
reduced expectation of privacy.”81  The court, weighing the reduced expectation of 
privacy against the government’s interest in identification of convicted felons and 
the minimal intrusion involved in blood sampling, found the search reasonable.82 
                                                           
law enforcement’s stop and search of a parolee without individualized suspicion because of a 
parolee’s diminished expectation of privacy and the state’s substantial interest in supervising 
parolees). 
 73 “The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of 
a search is determined ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an 
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests.’”  Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-19 (2001) (citing Wyoming v. 
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). 
 74 Mich. State Police Dep’t v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment does not always require a warrant or probable cause if the intrusion is only minor 
and supported by a compelling government interest in law enforcement). 
 75 For federal circuit courts using the totality of the circumstances approach to analysis 
sampling from offenders, see, e.g., Conley, 453 F.3d at 681.  For state courts applying the 
same method, see Johnson v. Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 769 (Va. 2000); Doles v. State, 994 
P.2d 315 (Wyo. 1999); In re Maricopa, 930 P.2d 496, 500-01 (Ariz. 1997). 
 76 See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987). 
 77 State v. Steele, 802 N.E.2d 1127, 1134 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (citing Gaines v. State, 
998 P.2d 166 (Nev. 2000)); Landry v. Att’y. Gen., 709 N.E.2d 1085 (Mass. 1999). 
 78 Conley, 453 F.3d at 680-81. 
 79 Id. at 677. 
 80 Id. (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989)). 
 81 Id. at 680. 
 82 Id. at 680-81. 
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Ohio courts have applied this test in upholding a statute requiring DNA samples 
from juvenile offenders convicted of gross sexual imposition.83  The Ohio appellate 
court compared the diminished constitutional rights of the juvenile probationer and 
the minimal intrusion of drawing blood with the government’s legitimate interest in 
deterring future sex offenders and solving other crimes.84  The court held that the 
search was reasonable because it was minimally intrusive and justified by the 
government’s legitimate “interest in keeping a DNA data bank.”85 
2.  The Special Needs Doctrine and Post Conviction DNA Statutes 
The “special needs” doctrine is an exception to the warrant requirement for when 
the circumstances render “the warrant or probable cause requirement impractical.”86  
The Supreme Court has upheld “certain regimes of suspicionless searches where the 
program was designed to serve ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement.’”87  The special needs doctrine involves a two-part inquiry: the court 
must determine (1) whether the statute presents a valid special need and then (2) 
balance the individual’s privacy interest with the special need of the government.88  
In determining whether the government has a valid special need, the critical inquiry 
is whether or not the search in question is simply to further ordinary law 
enforcement objectives.89  Therefore, unless there is something more than a “general 
interest in crime control” to justify the search, the “special needs” doctrine will not 
apply.90  If there is a valid special need, the court must then balance the individual’s 
privacy interest with the special need of the government to determine if the search 
violates the Fourth Amendment.91 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also applied the “special needs” doctrine to 
uphold the post conviction DNA statute in Conley.92  The court found three valid 
special needs of the government beyond general law enforcement: (1) obtaining 
reliable proof of a felon’s identity, (2) deterring convicted felons from committing 
                                                           
 83 In re Nicholson, 724 N.E.2d 1217 (Ohio App. Ct. 1999). 
 84 Id. at 1221. 
 85 Id. 
 86 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 87 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (invalidating a roadside check 
point for the purpose of detecting illegal drugs) (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 
U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding random drug testing program for student-athletes)); Treasury 
Emps. v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (upholding drug testing for government employees 
seeking promotions or transfers to certain positions); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 
U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding drug testing for railway employees involved in accidents or in 
violation of safety regulations). 
 88 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78-81 (2001); Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37. 
 89 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41. 
 90 Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979)). 
 91 State v. Steele, 802 N.E.2d 1127, 1137 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (citing Ferguson, 532 U.S. 
67 and Edmond, 531 U.S. 32).  
 92 United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 677-79 (6th Cir. 2006). 
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additional crimes, and (3) protecting communities.93  The court then weighed the 
special needs of the government “in obtaining Conley’s DNA” and found the needs 
outweighed “her greatly reduced expectation of privacy as a convicted felon.”94 
In State v. Steel, the Court of Appeals of Ohio for the First District applied the 
“special needs” doctrine to uphold the constitutionality of an Ohio law requiring the 
collection of a DNA sample from convicted offenders.95  The court determined that 
the DNA statute had two purposes beyond normal law enforcement: (1) increasing 
the accuracy of the criminal justice system and (2) the solving of future crimes not 
yet committed.96  The court then evaluated the statute by balancing the intrusion into 
the individual’s privacy interest and a probationer’s diminished expectation of 
privacy with the previously stated special needs.97  The court determined that the 
taking of a DNA sample was reasonable even without individualized suspicion under 
the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment.98 
Conley and Steele are examples of why the use of the special needs doctrine to 
analyze DNA statutes in general is problematic.99  Courts have listed some of the 
following purposes as beyond those of normal law enforcement: (1) determining the 
identity of felons, (2) deterring future crimes, (3) protecting communities, (4) 
improving accuracy in the criminal justice system, and (5) solving future crimes.100  
The problem is that protecting communities, deterring future crimes, and solving 
future crimes are exactly what law enforcement agencies are designed to do.101  The 
other two special needs proposed involve properly identifying convicted felons.102  
Identifying felons may appear on its face to be separate from “normal law 
enforcement purposes,” but the identification of felons serves one primary purpose: 
solving crimes.103  Solving crimes is a general law enforcement purpose.104  The use 
of the special needs doctrine in these cases is an example of courts wanting to uphold 
a useful crime-solving tool while rigidly adhering to precedent.  The end result is a 
                                                           
 93 Id. at 679.   
 94 Id.  
 95 Steele, 802 N.E.2d at 1137.  The law in question is actually an earlier incarnation of the 
current felony-arrestee DNA statute that required sampling only from convicted offenders.  
 96 Id. at 1136.  
 97 Id. at 1137. 
 98 Id.  
 99 Id.; Conley, 453 F.3d 674. 
 100 Steele, 802 N.E.2d at 1136; Conley, 453 F.3d at 679. 
 101 See, e.g., Division of Police, CITY OF LAKEWOOD, OHIO, http://onelakewood.com/ 
PublicSafety/Police/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2013) (explaining what police departments are 
designed for, as described in the City of Lakewood, Ohio’s Police Departments Missions 
statement).  
 102 Steele, 802 N.E.2d at 1136; Conley, 453 F.3d at 679. 
 103 The court in Steele actually admitted that some of what it described as valid “special-
need searches . . . may ultimately be used for law enforcement purposes.”  Steele, 802 N.E.2d 
at 1136. 
 104 See cases cited supra note 87. 
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misapplication of the special needs doctrine, which in its current form cannot be 
used to uphold convicted offender DNA statutes.105 
C.  Application of Fourth Amendment Tests to Arrestee DNA Statutes 
The previous decisions dealt with DNA statutes as applied to convicted felons or 
parolees; Ohio’s felony-arrestee statute is broader because it applies to all persons 
arrested for a felony.106  Early applications of the Fourth Amendment to arrestee 
DNA statutes found both state and federal courts holding that the special needs 
doctrine does not apply, and instead analyzed the statutes under the totality of the 
circumstances test.107  The Ninth and Third Federal Circuits and the Supreme Court 
of Virginia have all upheld arrestee DNA statutes as constitutional.108  State courts in 
California, Maryland, and Minnesota and some federal district courts have held 
arrestee DNA statutes to be unreasonable violations of the Fourth Amendment under 
the totality of the circumstances test.109 
1.  Totality of Circumstances Test 
United States v. Mitchell, People v. Buza, Haskell v. Harris, and King v. State are 
all examples of how courts applying the totality of the circumstances test have 
reached different outcomes.110  In United States v. Mitchell, the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals upheld the federal all-arrestee DNA statutes as constitutional when 
applied to a person arrested for “possession with intent to distribute cocaine.”111  
Mitchell objected to the government’s attempt to collect a DNA sample after his 
indictment, claiming that the statute violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on 
                                                           
 105 John D. Biancamano, Note, Arresting DNA: The Evolving Nature of DNA Collection 
Statutes and their Fourth Amendment Justifications, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 619, 655-59 (2009). 
 106 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 107 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc); People v. 
Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 760 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review granted by 262 P.3d 854 
(Cal. 2011); State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Comp., 780 N.E.2d 981, 
986 (Ohio 2002). 
 108 See Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387; Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2012); Anderson 
v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702 (Va. 2007) (holding that DNA sampling from all felony 
arrestees based on probable cause was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
 109 See United States v. Frank, No. CR-09-2075-EFS-1, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32542, at 
*1 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 1, 2010) (denying government’s motion to compel DNA samples); Buza, 
129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (holding that taking a DNA sample from all felony arrestees as part of 
the booking process was a violation of the Fourth Amendment); King v. State, 42 A.3d 549 
(Md. 2012) (holding that Maryland’s felony-arrestee DNA law is unconstitutional as applied 
to an arrestee, never convicted of the crime of arrest, whose sample was used to convict him 
of a previous rape); In re Welfare of C.T.L., Juvenile, 722 N.W.2d 484, (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) 
(holding that taking a DNA sample from a juvenile arrestee prior to conviction was a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment). 
 110 Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387; Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753; Haskell, 669 F.3d 1049; King, 42 
A.3d 549. 
 111 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 389.  
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unreasonable searches.112  The district court found that “Mitchell’s status as an 
arrestee and a pretrial detainee” meant that he “‘ha[d] a diminished expectation of 
privacy in his identity’ and thus [could] be subjected to routine booking procedures 
such as fingerprinting.”113  The district court, however, did not agree that a 
fingerprint and the taking of a DNA sample amounted to the same level of intrusion 
and thus held that the statute was an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.114  The Third Circuit reversed, determining that DNA collection from 
arrestees and pretrial detainees does not violate the Fourth Amendment.115 
The court first determined that a DNA profile was “a tool for establishing 
identity,” and therefore the issue was how great was Mitchell’s “expectation of 
privacy in his . . . own identity.”116  The government in Mitchell’s case had already 
been convinced there was probable cause to believe he committed a crime.117  The 
court concluded, “[i]n light of this probable cause finding, arrestees possess a 
diminished expectation of privacy in their own identity.”118  The diminished 
expectation of privacy justified the taking of fingerprints, photographs, and DNA 
profiles for identification purposes.119  
The next step in the court’s analysis was to determine to what degree the search 
was necessary to promote a legitimate government interest.120  The court concluded 
that the government had a “strong interest in identifying arrestees.”121  DNA 
provides the government with a more reliable process to identify criminals who have 
changed their name or appearance, making DNA an important to tool to accurately 
identify the arrestee.122  The court then balanced the diminished expectation of 
privacy that an arrestee possesses in his or her identity against the legitimate 
government interest in accurately identifying criminals and the minimal privacy 
intrusion because of the safeguards provided to limit the amount of personal 
information revealed.123  The court held that the government’s interest and the 
minimal intrusion outweighed an arrestee’s diminished expectation of privacy.124 
                                                           
 112 Id.; 42 U.S.C.S. § 14135a(a)(1)(A) (LexisNexis 2013) (allowing the government to 
collect DNA samples from “individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted”).   
 113 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 390 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 608 
(W.D. Pa. 2009)).  
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 416. 
 116 Id. at 410 (“Instead, the critical question is whether arrestees and pretrial detainees who 
have not been convicted of felonies have a diminished privacy interest in their identity.”). 
 117 Id. at 412. 
 118 Id.  
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 413. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 414. 
 123 Id. at 415-16. 
 124 Id. 
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In People v. Buza, the California Appellate Court determined that California’s 
statute requiring the sampling from an arrestee during the booking procedure 
violated the appellant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.125  This case involved a person required to submit to a DNA 
collection procedure before there had been any judicial determination of probable 
cause.126  The court in Buza applied the totality of the circumstances test, but took a 
different view on a couple of the factors in the balancing test.  For one, it concluded 
that the primary purpose of California’s arrestee DNA statute was not identification 
of arrestees.127  Instead, the court stated, “[t]here can be no doubt that this use of 
DNA samples is for purposes of criminal investigation rather than simple 
identification.”128  Another factor on which the court in Buza differed was the 
arrestee’s expectation of privacy.129  The court did not agree that arrestees have a 
diminished expectation of privacy, because there had been no judicial finding of 
probable cause.130 
The court then weighed the intrusion into the privacy rights of the arrestee 
against the government’s interest in having a valuable crime-solving tool.131  The 
court held that since identification was not the purpose of the statute and the 
government’s interest in a useful crime-fighting tool could not outweigh a person’s 
expectation of privacy, California’s felony-arrestee DNA statute was 
unconstitutional.132 
Haskell v. Harris involved a challenge to California’s felony-arrestee law by four 
plaintiffs who were arrested and required to give a DNA sample but never 
convicted.133  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s denial of 
a preliminary injunction to stop the enforcement of the felony-arrestee sampling 
provision.134 
                                                           
 125 People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 760 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review granted 
by 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011). 
 126 Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 766. 
 127 Id. at 772-75 (stating that DNA samples are not necessary or feasible for quickly 
identifying an arrestee as it can take over a month for the sample to be entered into the 
database). 
 128 Id. at 774.  
 129 Id. at 779. 
 130 Id. at 782 (“[A]n individual such as appellant, who has not yet been the subject of a 
judicial determination of probable cause, falls closer to the ordinary citizen end of the 
continuum than one as to whom probable cause has been found by a judicial officer or grand 
jury.”). 
 131 Id. at 782-83. 
 132 Id. at 783 (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (“‘[T]he mere fact that 
law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the 
Fourth Amendment.’  If it did, the State could take a DNA sample from every citizen and use 
it for investigative purpose, an Orwellian prospect.”)).  
 133 Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 134 Id. at 1065. 
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The majority in Haskell applied the totality of the circumstances test, balancing 
the privacy interests of the plaintiffs with the government’s interest in law 
enforcement.135  The privacy expectation, according to the majority, was 
“significantly diminished” by the multitude of evasive and degrading searches that 
can take place as part of the booking procedure.136  The court concluded that there 
was not a significant privacy right to intrude upon due to the low expectation of 
privacy at booking, combined with the minimal intrusiveness of the search and the 
safeguards imposed by the law.137  The majority found that the government had four 
important interests: “identifying arrestees, solving past crimes, preventing future 
crimes, and exonerating the innocent.”138  After balancing the factors and weighing 
in favor of the government against the diminished expectation of privacy, the 
majority held that California’s felony-arrestee DNA law was not an unreasonable 
violation of the Fourth Amendment and thus the district court was correct in 
rejecting the preliminary injunction.139 
The dissent in Haskell argued that the California law was unconstitutional based 
on three alternative theories.140  The first was that Friedman v. Boucher directly 
prohibits the taking of DNA from an arrestee without a warrant or “suspicion of a 
crime that the DNA might solve.”141  The next argument was that DNA is analogous 
to fingerprinting and that DNA testing, like fingerprinting, can only be used to 
identify suspects, not for investigation purposes.142  The second argument relied on a 
line of cases stating that fingerprints taken for investigation without consent, a 
warrant, or probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment.143  The dissent applied 
this reasoning to hold that taking DNA “without a warrant, and without suspicion of 
any crime committed by the arrestee that the DNA will help solve, violates the 
Fourth Amendment.”144  Lastly, the dissent briefly mentioned that the majority 
overstated the government’s interest and understated the plaintiffs’ privacy 
expectations.145  
                                                           
 135 Id. at 1057-58. 
 136 Id. at 1058. 
 137 Id. at 1062. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 1066. 
 140 Id. at 1066-67 (Fetcher, J., dissenting). 
 141 Id. at 1069 (citing Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 2009) (involving 
Nevada police forcibly taking a DNA sample from a person arrested for a crime committed in 
Montana, when there was no Nevada law allowing the warrantless taking of a DNA sample; 
the majority distinguishes Friedman quite convincingly based on the fact that it only applies 
to the very narrow factual situation that it involved)). 
 142 Id. at 1073. 
 143 Id. at 1076 (citing Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 
811 (1985); United States v. Garcia-Beltran, 389 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Ortiz-Hernandez, 427 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
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King v. State involved facial and as applied challenges to the Maryland arrestee 
DNA statute.146  The defendant, Alonzo King, was arrested for assault, a qualifying 
offense under Maryland's statute.147  His DNA was taken upon arrest and added into 
the state's DNA database.148  Prior to the resolution of his assault charges, a DNA 
“hit” matched King's sample taken upon arrest with a sample related to an unsolved 
rape case.149  The police then obtained a search warrant based on this match and 
retrieved another DNA sample that confirmed the original DNA match.150  The DNA 
match was the only evidence presented to indict and convict King.151  King was 
found guilty of the rape and sentenced to life in prison.152 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the statute was unconstitutional as 
applied to King.153  The court used the totality of the circumstances balancing test 
and compared the government’s interest in correctly identifying King with his 
reasonable expectation of privacy.154  The court determined that King, as an arrestee, 
had a lower expectation of privacy than the general public, but that the presumption 
of innocence and the nature of the information collected by DNA sampling 
outweighed the government's interest in correctly identifying him.155  The court 
rejected the fingerprint analogy and instead compared the information contained in 
DNA profiles to a warrantless search of medical records.156  The court agreed with 
the Minnesota court of appeals that probable cause for arrest “cannot serve as the 
probable cause for a DNA search of an arrestee.”157  The court reasoned that the 
government could achieve the same identification through less intrusive means.158  
Therefore, the government’s interest in properly identifying criminals did not 
outweigh King’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his own genetic material.159 
The likelihood of the court’s decision being upheld is doubtful.  The court took 
the unusual step of granting a stay of the Maryland Court of Appeals’s decision 
before granting certiorari.160  Stays are ordered when it is likely the Supreme Court 
                                                           
 146 King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 553 (Md. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012). 
 147 King, 42 A.3d at 553. 
 148 Id.  
 149 Id. at 553-54. 
 150 Id. at 554. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. at 555. 
 153 Id. at 556. 
 154 Id.  
 155 Id. at 577. 
 156 Id. at 576-77. 
 157 Id. at 578. 
 158 Id. at 579. 
 159 Id. at 576-79. 
 160 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1 (2012) (granting a stay of the Maryland Court of 
Appeals’ decision). 
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will grant certiorari, overturn the lower court’s decision, and that denial of the stay 
will result in serious harm.161  Oral arguments were held on February 26, 2013.162  
The Supreme Court's decision to take the case and the indication it will likely reverse 
the Maryland Court of Appeals illustrates the need for clarity in our application of 
Fourth Amendment principles to arrestee DNA statutes. 
Mitchell, Buza, Haskell, and King are examples of how courts have had difficulty 
applying the totality of circumstances test to arrestee DNA laws.163  The different 
courts emphasized a number of factors, including the subject’s expectation of 
privacy, whether the law provided safeguards for the storing and use of the DNA, the 
government’s interest in correctly identifying criminals, and whether there was a 
probable cause determination.164  All the cases deal with a timeline from arrest and to 
either conviction or release.  At what point during that timeline the court decides the 
relevant search occurred determines the strength of the relevant factors. 
The majority and dissent in Haskell analyzed California’s arrestee law as only 
implicating one search: the initial swab.165  The Haskell court, by focusing on the 
initial swab as the key search, completely mischaracterized the privacy expectation 
of the plaintiffs in the case.166  “Two of the plaintiffs were never charged” with a 
crime, while the “other two plaintiffs were charged with felonies, but the charges 
were dismissed.”167  The plaintiffs’ expectations of privacy were greater than that of 
a recent arrestee with a recent probable cause determination.168  The plaintiffs had 
already been released and the charges dropped, making their expectations of privacy 
exactly the same as someone who had never been arrested at all.169  
Mitchell and Buza, on the other hand, considered the laws to implicate another 
search, when the sample was added to the DNA database, and focused analysis on 
this search.170 
The courts in Mitchell and Buza came to different determinations of the 
constitutionality of arrestee DNA laws, but the two cases do not actually contradict 
one another.171   The reason is that the court in Mitchell considered an arrestee to 
have the same diminished expectation of privacy as a pre-trial detainee after a 
                                                           
 161 Id. at 2 (citing Conkright v. Frommert, 556 U.S. 1401, 1402 (2009)). 
 162 Oral Argument, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12-207), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_207. 
 163 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc); People v. Buza, 129 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 760 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review granted by 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 
2011); Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 164 See cases cited supra note 109. 
 165 Haskell, 669 F.3d at 1058. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. at 1066. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 406 (3d Cir. 2011); People v. Buza, 129 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 753, 760 (Ct. App. 2011). 
 171 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 416; Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 783. 
19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
548 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:529 
probable cause determination.  However, the court in Buza considered an arrestee’s 
expectation of privacy when there was no judicial determination of probable cause to 
resemble a person who has never entered the criminal justice system.172  Thus, it 
makes a fundamental difference at what point on the timeline the court decided that 
the relevant search occurred, and whether the court considers the arrestee’s privacy 
expectations to be similar to a convicted offender or those that have never entered 
the criminal justice system.173 
King is an excellent example of why a different approach for analyzing the 
constitutionality of arrestee sampling is needed.174  The Maryland Court of Appeals 
correctly identified the government's interest and the defendant's diminished 
expectation of privacy.175  The court, however, did not correctly balance the interests 
as applied to the defendant.176  The DNA was taken and a profile created, leading to 
a match all while King was still awaiting adjudication of his assault charge.177  
Therefore, as applied to King, the statute did not violate his Fourth Amendment 
protections because the government's interest outweighed his minimal expectation of 
privacy.  The court did not address the facial challenge to the statute, although they 
did express some doubt as to its facial validity.178  The approach presented in Part III 
of this Note solves the problems associated with the Maryland Court of Appeals' 
application of the totality of the circumstances test while still protecting those 
persons whose right to be free from unreasonable searches Maryland's statute 
violates.179 
The analysis of arrestee DNA sampling in Mitchell and Buza and the 
misapplication of the totality of the circumstances test as applied to the plaintiffs in 
Haskell and King show the need for a different approach in order to properly analyze 
the searches that a felony-arrestee statute implicates. 
2.  Special Needs Doctrine 
The special needs doctrine has never been used to uphold a felony-arrestee DNA 
statute.180  Even courts that have found felony-arrestee statutes constitutional have 
expressed that the special needs doctrine does not apply.181  Yet some commentators 
                                                           
 172 Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 782-83. 
 173 See, e.g., Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 411-12; Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 782-83; Haskell, 669 
F.3d at 1065. 
 174 King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 576-79 (Md. 2012). 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. at 553-54. 
 178 Id. at 553. 
 179 See infra Part III.A.2. 
 180 See, e.g., United States v. Frank, No. CR-09-2075-EFS-1, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
32542, at *1 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 1, 2010) (rejecting the special needs doctrine because the needs 
indemnified “are for classic law enforcement purposes”). 
 181 United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated by 659 F.3d 761 
(9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the application of the special needs doctrine “because the ‘special 
needs’ exception applies only to non-law enforcement purposes”). 
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argue that the best way to analyze felony arrestee statutes is under the special needs 
doctrine.182  The issue is that courts do not seem ready to accept this as a possibility, 
something that commentators proposing changes have been forced to admit.183   
Another, more pressing, issue with attempting to analyze arrestee DNA statutes 
under the special needs doctrine is that DNA statutes in general do not survive the 
first prong of the test.184  The special needs doctrine is meant for things beyond 
normal law enforcement purposes.185  As previously discussed, although courts have 
used the special needs doctrine to uphold sampling from convicted felons, it is not a 
proper application because the special needs provided amount to nothing more than 
general law enforcement purposes.186  Many of the same justifications have been 
provided for arrestee DNA statutes, namely the identification of criminals that have 
already committed crimes and deterring and solving future crimes.187  Since these 
justifications are part of general law enforcement purposes, the special needs 
doctrine cannot be used to justify the sampling of arrestees.188 
3.  Anderson v. Commonwealth and the Fingerprint Analogy 
The Supreme Court of Virginia has upheld Virginia’s arrestee DNA statute, 
analogizing it to taking someone’s fingerprints as part of a normal booking 
procedure.189  Other courts have used this analogy of fingerprinting, that appears in 
Anderson v. Commonwealth, to support the position that DNA is nothing more than 
an identification tool.190 
Anderson resulted from a challenge to Virginia’s felony-arrestee DNA statute 
that required a sample of Anderson’s DNA to be taken upon arrest and added to the 
DNA databank.191  The Virginia Supreme Court held that “[a] DNA sample of the 
accused taken upon arrest, while more revealing, is no different in character than 
acquiring fingerprints upon arrest.”192  The court then reasoned that since DNA 
                                                           
 182 Derek Regensburger, DNA Databanks and the Fourth Amendment: The Time has Come 
to Reexamine the Special Needs Exception to the Warrant Requirement and the Primary 
Purpose Test, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 319, 386 (2009)  (arguing that the same special 
needs that justify profiling convicted offenders apply to arrestees). 
 183 Id. (“Unfortunately, if the special needs test is applied rather than a balancing test and 
the Ferguson/Edmond primary purpose is adhered to, such an extension of DNA testing would 
likely be declared invalid.”). 
 184 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78-81 (2001). 
 185 Id. 
 186 See supra Part II.B.2. 
 187 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 413 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 188 United States v. Frank, No. CR-09-2075-EFS-1, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32542, at *1 
(E.D. Wash. Apr. 1, 2010). 
 189 Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702, 706 (Va. 2007). 
 190 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 410 (stating that DNA samples are “used solely as an accurate, 
unique identifying maker—in other words as fingerprints for the twenty-first century”). 
 191 Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 704. 
 192 Id. at 705. 
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sampling is no more intrusive than the taking of a fingerprint, and fingerprints are 
not a prohibited search under the Fourth Amendment, the minor intrusion of a DNA 
sample does not violate the arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights because no 
individualized suspicion or warrant is required.193 
The fingerprint analogy has some serious flaws.  For one, fingerprints do not 
contain the same type of information that a person’s DNA sample does, and thus do 
not implicate the same level of privacy intrusion.194  This is because a DNA sample, 
unlike a fingerprint, contains a person’s entire genetic profile, including the ability to 
see possible character traits and predisposition to diseases.195  Second, the analogy of 
DNA samples with fingerprints does not actually justify the sampling under the 
Fourth Amendment.196 Although fingerprinting is a routine practice in this country, it 
has never actually been analyzed under the modern understanding of the Fourth 
Amendment.197  Thus, using the analogy as support for DNA sampling surviving a 
Fourth Amendment analysis is faulty since the practice of fingerprinting has never 
actually be considered in that manner.198 
4.  State v. Emerson and a Person’s Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in a DNA 
Profile 
The Ohio Supreme Court recently ruled in State v. Emerson that no person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a lawfully-obtained DNA profile.199  The 
decision does not discuss the constitutionality of Ohio’s felony-arrestee DNA statute 
directly, but in holding that a defendant lack’s standing to object to the use of DNA 
profiles, the court effectively upheld the collection and use of DNA profiles from 
anyone for any reason.200   
In Emerson, the appellant, Dajuan Emerson, was accused of rape in 2005.201  As 
a part of this investigation, a DNA sample was obtained pursuant to a valid 
warrant.202  Emerson’s DNA sample was processed and a DNA profile created and 
included in Combined DNA Index System (CODIS).203  Emerson was eventually 
acquitted of the rape charge, but his DNA profile remained in the CODIS database, 
subject to repeated searches.204   
                                                           
 193 Id. at 705-06. 
 194 Eiler, supra note 18, at 1211-12. 
 195 Id. (discussing what type of information is contained in DNA samples). 
 196 People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 760 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review granted 
by 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011) (citing United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 874 (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting)). 
 197 Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 770-71.  
 198 Id.  
 199 State v. Emerson, 981 N.E.2d 787, 789 (Ohio 2012). 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. 
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In 2007, as part of a murder investigation, the police found blood on a door 
handle.205  The blood sample was processed and a DNA profile created, entered into 
CODIS, and compared to the other DNA profiles in the database.206  The DNA 
profile from the murder scene matched Emerson’s profile still in the database.207  As 
a result of this match, Emerson was indicted for aggravated murder, aggravated 
burglary, and tampering with evidence.208  After the trial court denied Emerson’s 
motion to suppress the DNA evidence, the matter proceeded to trial.209  At trial, 
Emerson was convicted of aggravated murder.210   
The Ohio Supreme Court granted review on two issues: (1) does a person have 
standing to object to the retention and use of a lawfully-obtained DNA profile that 
was created from a criminal investigation even if the person was acquitted; and (2) 
does the state have the power to retain the profile and use it in subsequent 
investigations.211  
The court held that a person does not have standing to object to the use of a DNA 
profile.212  The court based its reasoning on the fact that other courts around the 
country have similarly held that “a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his or her DNA profile extracted from a lawfully obtained DNA sample.”213  The 
court determined that a DNA profile, unlike a DNA sample, is “the work product of 
the government.”214 Additionally, the court went on to compare the use of DNA 
sampling to that of fingerprinting because the DNA profile itself is merely an 
identification tool.215  
The Ohio Supreme Court’s analysis is fundamentally flawed.  First, in 
determining that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a DNA profile, the 
court misidentified exactly what information can be learned for a DNA profile.216  
The court reasoned that a DNA profile is merely work product, similar to other 
scientific evidence that laboratories create for trial.217  Further, the court’s reasoning 
                                                           
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. at 790. 
 207 Id.  
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. at 793. 
 213 Id. at 792 (citing Herman v. State 128 F.3d 469 (Nev. 2006) (holding that there was no 
standing to sue because “[a] reasonable person would have understood that the resulting DNA 
profile, like fingerprints, could be available for general investigative purposes”)); State v. 
Hauge, 79 P.3d 131 (Haw. 2003); Smith v. State, 744 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Ind. 2001).   
 214 Emerson, 981 N.E.2d at 791. 
 215 Id. at 792.  
 216 Id. at 792; United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (explaining 
that DNA profiles are more predictive than originally believed). 
 217 Emerson, 981 N.E.2d at 792. 
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that DNA profiles are merely identification tools similar to fingerprints is 
misleading.218  As previously discussed, DNA profiles are much more predictive 
than originally believed.219   
Second, although the Ohio Supreme Court decision does not directly touch upon 
the constitutionality of DNA sampling statutes, the holding that no person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her DNA profile opens the door for 
potentially unlimited uses of DNA sampling.220  The only point at which a person 
can challenge the government’s intrusion into his or her genetic makeup in Ohio is 
when the physical sample is being extracted.221  If the sample is obtained in a lawful 
manner, the constitution is satisfied.222  Because of the relative ease in which DNA 
can be lawfully obtained, the result of the court’s holding is that genetic information 
can be obtained and used in a variety of manners without any available protection.223   
The Ohio Supreme Court’s failure to consider the most up to date scientific 
understanding of junk-DNA and DNA profiles, as well as the potential implications 
of the decision, demonstrates that State v. Emerson is fundamentally flawed.  
Moreover, the Emerson decision underscores why this Note’s proposed view of 
arrestee DNA statutes, implicating three distinct search types, will provide courts 
with a better approach to analyze DNA sampling and profile creation.224 
III.  WHY OHIO’S FELONY-ARRESTEE DNA STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN 
ITS CURRENT FORM 
A.  Ohio’s Felony Arrestee Statute: Impact and Types of Searches Implicated 
1.  Impact of Ohio’s Felony-Arrestee Statute 
Ohio’s Felony-Arrestee DNA statute requires taking samples from two distinct 
groups of people: (1) those that will ultimately be found guilty of the crime of arrest 
and (2) those that will have the charges dismissed or be found not guilty at trial.225  
The first group of arrestees, those that will become convicted felons, will eventually 
                                                           
 218 Id. 
 219 Kincade, 379 F.3d 813; see also supra note 67.  
 220 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012) (declaring that Ohio’s felony-
arrestee DNA statute may still be challenged, because it mandates warrantless sampling of 
arrestees, which the Ohio Supreme Court has not ruled on; however, it is unlikely to be held 
unconstitutional as the searches implicated in the profile creation cannot be challenged 
according to the reasoning of Emerson). 
 221 Emerson, 981 N.E.2d at 791. 
 222 Id. at 793. 
 223 See Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178, 1190 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding that 
identifiable quantities of DNA can be found on coffee cups, doorknobs, and other common 
items); Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment and 
Genetic Privacy, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 857, 861 (2006) (noting that Los Angeles police solved 
a murder by retrieving DNA from a recently used coffee cup).   
 224 See infra Part III.A.2. 
 225 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012). 
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be required to provide a DNA sample.226  Ohio courts have upheld the sampling of 
convicted felons.227 The only change to this first group is how soon the government 
collects the sample.228   
The real target of Ohio’s new DNA law is the second group: those who are 
innocent or whose guilt cannot be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.229  This group 
of individuals represents the real addition to the DNA database: before the enactment 
of the arrestee DNA law, people in the second group would never have their DNA 
samples taken and added to a database.230  In Ohio in 2010, there were 63,870 adults 
arrested for violent crimes.231  Additionally, another 314,050 adults were arrested for 
property crimes.232   Under the current statutory scheme, all 377,920 of these 
arrestees would have had a DNA sample taken as part of their booking procedures.233  
Based on reports from other states, anywhere from 30 to 40 percent of arrests never 
result in a conviction.234  In 2010 alone, Ohio’s arrestee DNA law would have 
resulted in the addition of over 100,000 new samples—of persons who will not be 
convicted of a crime—to Ohio’s DNA database that previously were unobtainable.235  
This is a substantial increase in the number of samples, considering that as of 
October 2011 there were only 398,377 profiles in CODIS from Ohio.236   
The substantial increase in the number of samples included in the state’s DNA 
database may allow law enforcement to solve a greater number of violent crimes and 
crimes of a sexual nature.237  Although there is a clear benefit to Ohio’s law 
                                                           
 226 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07(B)(2) (LexisNexis 2012) (requiring that anyone 
convicted of a felony submit to a DNA sampling procedure). 
 227 State v. Steele, 802 N.E.2d 1127 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). 
 228 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2012). 
 229 See, e.g., Biancamano, supra note 105, at 654 (“[A]rrestee statutes really only target 
individuals who are not ultimately found guilty of the crime for which they have been 
arrested.”). 
 230 S.B. 77, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2010) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2901.07(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2012)). 
 231 Uniform Crime Reports Table 69 Arrests by State 2010, FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION (2010), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl69.xls. Violent crimes include murder, 
manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.   
 232 Id.  Property crimes are the offenses of burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and 
arson. 
 233 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 234 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 235 This number is based on a conservative 30 percent of 2010 arrests not resulting in 
convictions.  See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 236 CODIS—NDIS Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Jan. 2013), 
www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics/#Ohio. 
 237 John Maddux, Comment, Arresting Development: A Call for North Carolina to Expand 
Its Forensic Database by Collecting DNA from Felony Arrestees, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 103, 
117-19 (2009) (arguing that the benefits of collecting samples from arrest suspects outweigh 
the risks). 
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enforcement agencies, the repeated search of an innocent person’s DNA as required 
by the statutory revision is unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances 
balancing test and not justified by the special needs doctrine.238 
2.  Analyzing Ohio’s Felony-Arrestee DNA Statute as Involving Three Types of 
Searches 
Generally, courts approach arrestee DNA statutes as containing a two-part 
search.239  Part one is the initial buccal swab.240  Courts have routinely held that 
bodily invasions similar to buccal swabs are searches that implicate the Fourth 
Amendment.241  A buccal swab does not, however, reveal any personal information 
unless it is analyzed and included in a searchable database.242  The second search is 
the inclusion of the DNA profile in the database and the resulting comparison with 
other profiles.243  Courts have focused their analysis on this second search, as it 
implicates greater privacy concerns. Courts have not analyzed each and every 
database search; instead, the focus has been on whether the type of search, the 
comparison of one DNA sample to another, is reasonable.244  The concept that all 
comparisons of DNA samples are created equal is problematic, because depending 
on at what point during the criminal investigation and prosecution the subject is at, 
the government’s interests and the person’s privacy expectations vary.245  It is more 
analytically accurate and practical to consider the database search not as the one 
search phase in a two-part search, but rather as two distinct search types depending 
on whether the subject is still facing charges.   
The first of these search types is DNA specimen comparisons of those profiles 
from people the government is still investigating, prosecuting, or has already 
convicted. The second search type is the DNA profile comparisons of people who 
have had the charges dismissed, been found not guilty, or exonerated in any other 
manner.  Analyzing the statute as involving two types of database searches provides 
a more effective way of determining in what situations Ohio’s felony-arrestee DNA 
statute is constitutional. 
                                                           
 238 See infra Parts III.A-B. 
 239 People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 760 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review granted 
by 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011). 
 240 Buza, 129 Cal. Rprt. 3d at 760. 
 241 State v. Steele, 802 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003); Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
760 (“Courts have routinely held the collection of DNA by means of a blood test is a minimal 
intrusion into an individual’s privacy interest in bodily integrity while collection by buccal 
swab is even less intrusive.”) (internal citations omitted); United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 
387, 406 (3rd Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 242 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2011). 
 243 Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 760 (“The latter search is the true focus of our analysis and 
the analyses of other courts that have considered the validity of DNA statutes.”). 
 244 Id.; Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 407. 
 245 See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (determining that parolees 
have a diminished expectation of privacy).  
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B.  Application of the Totality of the Circumstances Test 
The totality of the circumstances test requires the balancing of the person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy and the intrusiveness of the government’s 
incursion against the government’s interest in effective law enforcement.246  The 
balancing test must be applied to each of three distinct search types that Ohio’s 
statute requires.247  As this Note has previously discussed, the constitutionality of 
arrestee DNA statutes has turned primarily on the arrestee’s diminished expectation 
of privacy in his or her identification.248  Courts have also considered the 
government’s interest in identifying criminals and have shown preferences that there 
be some safeguards to protect the private information contained within DNA 
samples.249  The most important factor in determining whether or not an arrestee 
DNA statute will be upheld as constitutional is how great is the subject’s expectation 
of privacy.250 
The first search type is the bodily intrusion that happens during the buccal cheek 
swab.251  The primary manner of collecting a DNA sample under Ohio’s arrestee 
DNA statute is via a buccal swab, a procedure arguably less intrusive than a forcible 
blood draw.252  According to the United States Supreme Court, “blood tests do not 
constitute an unduly extensive imposition on individuals’ privacy and bodily 
integrity.”253  Ohio courts have also upheld blood sampling as a means of retrieving 
DNA samples, stating that it is a “minimal intrusion.”254    The physical swab itself 
does not reveal any private information before the sample is added to a database.255  
The government’s interest in collecting the swabs for potential evidentiary purposes 
and the minimal physical intrusion outweighs the almost negligible privacy concerns 
implicated by the swabbing procedure, making this first search type reasonable.256 
The second search type implicated by Ohio’s arrestee DNA statute is database 
comparisons of people currently under arrest or facing charges. When this type of 
search occurs, courts must balance the government’s interest in properly identifying 
persons under criminal suspicion against the intrusion into the subject’s expectation 
                                                           
 246 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 247 See Eiler, supra note 18, at 1209. 
 248 See supra Part II.C.1. 
 249 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 407-08. 
 250 People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 760 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review granted 
by 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011). 
 251 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 406. 
 252 Eiler, supra note 18, at 1210; Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 760. 
 253 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 406 (citing Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985)). 
 254 State v. Steele, 802 N.E.2d 1127, 1133 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (citing In re Nicholson, 
724 N.E.2d 1217 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999)). 
 255 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 256 See, e.g., Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 506-07 (citing Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 656 (2d 
Cir. 2005)) (upholding the buccal swab as a minimal intrusion); United States v. Weikert, 504 
F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2007). 
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of privacy in his or her DNA sample.257   The major factor in this determination is 
the diminished expectation of privacy that an arrestee still facing charges has in his 
identity.258  Law enforcement officials have made a probable cause determination 
that a crime has been committed, justifying the arrest, and as a result the subject can 
expect privacy incursions as part of the booking procedure and detention.259  Based 
on this probable cause determination and the fact that arrestees must submit to 
routine booking procedures and detention, an arrestee currently in the criminal 
justice system has a diminished expectation of privacy in his identity.260  The 
government’s interest in properly identifying arrestees and solving crimes outweighs 
the reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her DNA of an arrestee still facing 
charges.  
The last search type implicated by Ohio’s arrestee DNA statute is the database 
comparisons of people who are no longer facing charges because either the charges 
were dismissed or they were found not guilty.  The constitutionality of this search 
type also turns on the subject’s expectation of privacy.  Unlike the searches of those 
still facing charges, people who are no longer the targets of the criminal justice 
system do not have a diminished expectation of privacy.261  In fact, people who have 
been found not guilty or have had charges dismissed have the same expectation of 
privacy as someone who has never been arrested at all.262  The diminished 
expectation of privacy is directly linked to the government having a vested interest in 
a person because they pose some risk to society at large. If the criminal justice 
system has determined that no such risk exists, there is no justification for a 
diminished expectation of privacy.263  The privacy expectation that an innocent 
person has in his or her identity and personal information outweighs the 
government’s interest in identifying potential criminals.  If this were not the case, 
then the Fourth Amendment would provide no protection in the area of DNA 
sampling and the government could require the warrantless DNA sampling of any 
individual.264  This “Orwellian nightmare” is not the state of the law, however, and 
since a person’s expectation of privacy outweighs the government’s interest in 
identifying potential criminals, the third type of search is unreasonable.265 
                                                           
 257 This search type directly parallels the expectation of privacy described in Mitchell.  
Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 410. 
 258 Id. at 412-13. 
 259 See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987). 
 260 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 412. 
 261 In re Welfare of C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484, 491 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (stating that the 
diminished expectation of privacy present in dealing with convicted offenders was not present 
in a juvenile arrestee). 
 262 People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 782 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review granted 
by 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011) (“[T]he category of arrestees . . . who has not yet been the subject 
of a judicial determination of probable cause, falls closer to the ordinary citizen end of the 
continuum.”). 
 263 In re Welfare of C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d at 491. 
 264 See Eiler, supra note 18, at 1229. 
 265 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 873 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (expressing 
concern over the far-reaching implications that allowing arrestee sampling will bring and 
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Ohio’s arrestee DNA statute is arguably constitutional as applied only to the 
second type of search: those who are still in the criminal justice system.  It is not 
constitutional when it results in the third type of search.  
C.  Application of the Special Needs Doctrine 
The special needs doctrine cannot be used to justify a search that is primarily for 
general law enforcement purposes.266  The reason that arrestee DNA statutes are 
analyzed under the special needs doctrine is due to a few circuit courts applying it to 
uphold sampling from convicted felons.267  The special needs doctrine has never 
been used to uphold the constitutionality of an arrestee DNA statute.268 
The special needs doctrine likewise cannot justify any of the three types of 
searches implicated by Ohio’s felony-arrestee statute.269  Identifying criminals has 
been the primary justification for why the government should be allowed to take 
DNA samples from arrestees.270  Other reasons have included deterring future 
criminal conduct and protecting communities.271  None of these justifications 
survives the first part of the special needs analysis, however, because each one is 
simply another way of stating the general purpose of law enforcement.  Identifying 
and apprehending criminals, deterring future criminals, and protecting our 
communities are exactly what law enforcement agencies are designed to do.272  The 
purpose of Ohio’s felony-arrestee DNA statute is to provide law enforcement 
agencies in Ohio with a more accurate DNA database to solve crimes, and as that is a 
general law enforcement purpose, the statute cannot be upheld using the special 
needs doctrine.273 
D.  Ohio’s Expungement Process Not a Solution 
Expungement methods are available in many state and federal government 
statutory schemes, including Ohio.274  Expungement is the process by which a 
convicted person either seals or destroys his or her criminal or other records held by 
the government.275 Expungement is problematic because the burden is generally 
                                                           
stating that this opens the door for DNA testing from all people.  “My colleagues in the 
plurality assure us that, when that day comes, they will stand vigilant and guard the line, but 
by then the line—never very clear to begin with—will have shifted.”). 
 266 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78-81 (2001). 
 267 Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 666 (2d Cir. 2003); Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 
678 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 268 United States v. Frank, No. CR-09-2075-EFS-1, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32542, at *1 
(E.D. Wash. Apr. 1, 2010). 
 269 See Regensburger, supra note 181, at 386. 
 270 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 413 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 271 See Regensburger, supra note 181, at 386. 
 272 United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 678 (6th Cir. 2006).  
 273 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 274 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.52 (LexisNexis 2012); MINN. STAT. § 299C.105 
(2011); CAL. PENAL CODE § 299 (Deering 2013). 
 275 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.52 (LexisNexis 2012). 
29Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
558 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:529 
placed entirely on the arrestee, it is not an option available to everyone, and usually 
does not end the constitutional violation in a timely manner.276 
The burden for seeking expungement is often placed on the individual rather than 
the government.277  This is problematic, as it automatically discourages those 
attempting to secure expungement of their records because they have to be 
proactive.278  Placing the burden on the individual is also problematic in that the 
actual expungement process is generally a difficult and lengthy process.279   
Ohio’s expungement process allows for a person to request to have his DNA 
profile sealed, but only if the BCII receives a “certified copy of a final court order 
establishing that the offender’s conviction has been overturned.”280  If there is still 
the possibility of appeal or “application of discretionary review,” it is not possible 
for a court to grant the sealing of the DNA record.281  The fact that a court cannot 
seal a record even after a person has been found not guilty or charges have been 
dismissed means that even proactive citizens will still be subject to violations of 
their constitutional protections against unreasonable searches. 
The sealing of the record in Ohio does not actually destroy the DNA record from 
the DNA database; it just restricts the access to the actual sample to those people 
listed in the statute.282  One of the groups of people who can still access a sealed 
record is law enforcement officials and prosecutors, for the purpose of determining 
the proper charges in a criminal prosecution.283  The subsection does not explicitly 
mention DNA, but as a DNA profile or a hit therefrom could possibly lead to an 
additional charge being added to the current arrestee, it is entirely possible that this 
exception could apply to DNA profiles.284  At the very least it is not clear which or if 
any of the exceptions to a sealed record apply to DNA profiles.285  The ambiguity in 
                                                           
 276 People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 782 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review granted 
by 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011). 
 277 Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 782. 
 278 Id.  
 279 Id. at 758 (“An arrestee must wait until the statute of limitations has run before 
requesting expungement; the court must wait 180 days before it can grant the request; the 
court’s order is not reviewable by appeal or by writ; the prosecutor can prevent expungement 
by objecting to the request.”).  
 280 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(H) (LexisNexis 2012). 
 281 Id. 
 282 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(D) (LexisNexis 2012) (stating that sealed records can 
be inspected by law enforcement, parole officers, the subject of the record, and by the BCII 
and Attorney General offices as part of background checks). 
 283 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(D)(1).  The relevant subsection states:  
Inspection of the sealed records included in the order may be made only by the 
following persons or for the following purposes: (1) By a law enforcement officer or 
prosecutor, or the assistants of either, to determine whether the nature and the 
character of the offense with which a person is to be charged would be affected by 
virtue of the person’s previously having been convicted of a crime. 
 284 Id. 
 285 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.32 (LexisNexis 2012). 
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the expungement statute opens a door for the possibility of continued searches of a 
sealed DNA profile in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on 
unreasonable searches.  
Ohio’s current process for sealing records does not end the continuing searching 
of an innocent person’s DNA profile, and therefore does not cure Ohio’s DNA law 
of its constitutional defect. 
IV.  PROPOSED CHANGES TO OHIO’S ALL-ARRESTEE DNA STATUTE 
A.  Proposed Judicial and Legislative Solutions 
1.  Proposed Judicial Solutions: Expanding the Exceptions to the Warrant 
Requirement 
One possible solution that has been discussed by commentators is a judicial 
solution: either expanding the special needs doctrine to encompass DNA sampling or 
creating a new exception to the warrant requirement.286   
One possible judicial solution would be the creation of a “DNA database 
exception” to the warrant requirement, an option advocated by Professor Kaye.287  
The reason that a new exception is the preferred choice, according to Professor 
Kaye, is based on the fact that arrestee DNA statutes are difficult to analyze under 
current precedent and the benefit outweighs the minimal privacy implications.288  In 
fact, the privacy implication is almost non-existent under this reasoning; the 
“physical intrusion is minimal” and “no additional privacy interest are 
implicated.”289  Since the privacy implications are so minimal, a warrant is not 
necessary to “protect against unwarranted invasions of privacy” but would place a 
real burden on law enforcement’s use of an important tool.290  Professor Kaye is 
satisfied as long as there are safeguards in place determining what information is 
contained in the sample and who has access to the sample.291  
Professor Kaye’s exception would allow for the warrantless DNA sampling of 
any citizen without any justification other than law enforcement feigning a need for 
the sample.292  The privacy expectation in DNA that she describes is so minimal that 
any government justification would suffice.293  As previously discussed, a person 
who has been arrested and subsequently had the charges dismissed, was acquitted at 
trial, or exonerated at a later time has the same expectation of privacy as someone 
                                                           
 286 Kaye, supra note 66, at 498-500; Regensburger, supra note 181, at 387-89. 
 287 Kaye, supra note 66, at 498. 
 288 Id. at 499. 
 289 Id. at 499-500.  In fact, Professor Kaye actually compares the privacy invasion 
implicated by a DNA sample to the privacy invasion that occurs when a fingerprint is taken 
during the booking procedure. 
 290 Id. at 500. 
 291 Id. at 504. 
 292 Id. at 500 (describing the Fourth Amendment implications as “de minimis” because 
“persons, houses, papers, and effects” are not implicated). 
 293 Id. at 499-500. 
31Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
560 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:529 
who has never been arrested.294  The notion that a person is innocent until proven 
guilty is one of the cornerstones of America’s judicial system and it applies to both 
arrestees and non-arrestees.  The privacy expectation that Professor Kaye describes 
is so minimal that it would allow for the DNA sampling from not only arrestees but 
also every citizen.  The DNA testing of all citizens is a brave new world that courts 
are not yet ready to accept.295  A new exception to the warrant requirement that 
conceivably would allow for the DNA testing of every citizen is too broad of a 
solution to implement. 
Another possible solution is to revert to the original special needs doctrine before 
Edmond and Ferguson added the general law enforcement purposes test.296  The 
original understanding of the special needs doctrine was that a special need could be 
for a “law enforcement related purpose.”297  The only stipulation was that the 
justification for the warrantless search had to be something more than the 
“elimination of the individual’s rights” in order to help “the police catch criminals 
more quickly.”298 
There are two issues with this solution; for one, it flies in the face of precedent 
and would be a “radical new theory” even by its creator’s admission.299  The special 
needs doctrine may not be a perfect area of the law, but it is a well-established 
exception to the warrant requirement that has been used to justify sobriety 
checkpoints and school drug testing.300  Reverting to a tougher standard would most 
likely put these precedents on shaky legal ground at best.301  The second reason is 
that even with this new standard, it is not clear that DNA sampling from felony 
arrestees would be upheld.  The two proposed special needs for DNA sampling are 
that DNA is different from other types of personal information and does not 
implicate the same privacy concerns and that it will greatly benefit crime control and 
protecting innocent people.302 As previously stated, DNA implicates some serious 
privacy concerns with the amount of personal information that it contains.303  At the 
very least, however, the idea that “DNA identification information does not 
implicate privacy concerns nearly to the same degree as . . . reading habits” is 
inaccurate.304  Secondly, crime control and protecting innocent people are not special 
                                                           
 294 See People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 782 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review 
granted by 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011). 
 295 See, e.g., United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 873 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). 
 296 Regensburger, supra note 181, at 387-88. 
 297 Id. at 388. 
 298 Id.  
 299 Id. at 387. 
 300 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 
515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
 301 Regensburger, supra note 181, at 389. 
 302 Id. at 389. 
 303 See supra Part II.A.2. 
 304 Regensburger, supra note 181, at 389; see supra Part II.A.2. 
32https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss2/9
2013] STRIKING A BALANCE 561 
 
needs because they are precisely what law enforcement agencies are tasked to do.305  
All that changing the special needs doctrine would do is eliminate a person’s privacy 
protection in their personal information in order to more easily catch criminals based 
on a DNA match.306  Therefore, the reversion to an original understanding of the 
special needs doctrine would not solve the problem of the constitutionality of 
arrestee DNA statutes. 
2.  Proposed Legislative Solution: Delaying the Addition of the Sample to the 
Database 
Another proposal has been to rewrite the federal version of an all-arrestee statute 
to delay the addition of a DNA specimen to the database.307  The proposed process 
would allow for the law enforcement agency to collect the specimen at arrest, but the 
specimen would not be analyzed or compared to other DNA profiles until after the 
subject was found guilty of the offense of arrest or the subject consented to the 
analysis.308  The reason for the delay is based on the argument that the only search 
required by an all-arrestee DNA statute that is constitutional is the physical cheek 
swab.309   
This argument that any addition of a DNA specimen to a DNA database is an 
unreasonable invasion of an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is 
contrary to the weight of authority and an application of the totality of the 
                                                           
 305 United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 678 (6th Cir. 2006).  
 306 Regensburger, supra note 181, at 390. 
 307 Eiler, supra note 18, at 1230-31 (proposing that the DNA specimen be held in a separate 
database until either the arrestee is convicted or the arrestee consents to the analysis and 
addition of the DNA specimen). 
 308 Id. at 1231-32.  The proposed language for the revision of the federal statute is as 
follows: 
(A) The Attorney General shall, as prescribed by the Attorney General through 
regulation, store such unanalyzed DNA samples in a databank that is not link to 
CODIS, nor searchable by any law enforcement official for any crime-solving 
purpose. 
(B) The Attorney General shall, upon the occurrence of either of the events in 
subparagraph (i) or (ii) below, furnish the analyzed DNA sample to the Director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, who shall carry out a DNA analysis on each such 
DNA sample and include the results in CODIS— 
(i) the conviction of the individual arrestee for a charge stemming from the 
circumstances that led to her arrest; or 
(ii) the knowing or voluntary consent of the individual arrestee for analysis of 
her DNA sample and the inclusion of the results in CODIS by the Attorney 
General. 
(C) If neither of the events detailed in the subparagraphs (i) or (ii) occur, the Attorney 
General shall, upon final disposition in favor of an arrestee of any charges stemming 
from the circumstances that led to her arrest, remove the arrestee’s DNA sample from 
the databank described in paragraph (2)(A) and destroy it. 
 309 Id. at 1219-20 (“It is only when the government goes beyond the physical extraction of 
DNA that an individual’s expectation of privacy in her personal information is invaded.”). 
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circumstances test to Ohio’s felony-arrestee DNA statute.310  The only searches that 
are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment are those that continue to occur after 
the person has been found not guilty, the charges have been dismissed, or they have 
been exonerated in any manner.311  This places a heavy burden on law enforcement 
because during the time it would take to determine someone’s eventual guilt or 
innocence, the sample could be analyzed and lead to the solving of unsolved rapes 
and murders.312  Thus, delaying the addition of samples to a DNA database is 
unnecessary because although it definitely secures the privacy interests of innocent 
people, it also places a burden on the government that the Fourth Amendment does 
not require.   
B.  Automatic Expungement as the Best Solution 
In order to achieve the proper balance and cure Ohio’s DNA law of its 
constitutional defects, the continuing searches of innocent citizens’ DNA profiles 
must be eliminated.313  The best solution is an automatic expungement process for 
DNA samples.314  Automatic expungement requires that the DNA sample and 
accompanying profile be destroyed as soon as the charges are dropped or the accused 
is found not guilty.315  Automatic expungement has two major benefits over the 
current system of sealing records.316  For one, the sample is actually destroyed, 
meaning that there is no possibility of any intentional or accidental future searches 
and constitutional violations.317  The second reason is that an automatic 
expungement, rather than proactive record sealing, ensures that every person is 
protected from constitutional violations, not just those with understanding and 
knowledge of the system. 
Automatic expungement would go even farther than the current expungement 
statute by requiring that a person originally convicted but later exonerated will also 
have his or her DNA profile destroyed.318  The exoneration portion will apply only if 
the person has no other convictions for which their DNA sample would have been 
lawfully collected.  
                                                           
 310 See supra Part III; see also Eiler, supra note 18, at 1230.  Much of Eiler’s analysis was 
based on the Western District of Pennsylvania’s decision in Mitchell.  The circuit court’s 
overruling of the district court’s decision makes Eiler’s conclusion that only the initial swab is 
constitutional unpersuasive. 
 311 See supra Part III. 
 312 Maddux, supra note 236, at 117-18 (using two cases as examples of how an all-arrestee 
DNA statute could have provided evidence that could have potentially stopped a rapist from 
harming more victims). 
 313 See supra Parts III and IV.A. 
 314 MINN. STAT. § 299C.105 Subd. 3 (2012) (requiring the destruction of the “biological 
specimen” when the person is found not guilty, but the person must request destruction if 
charges are dismissed). 
 315 See infra Part IV.C. 
 316 For the current process, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.32 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 317 Biancamano, supra note 104, at 650-51 (discussing the problems and inequalities that 
occur with the already extensive number of samples included in databases). 
 318 See supra Part IV.C. 
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This revision will mean that the only searches required by Ohio’s statute will be 
those that are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment tests.  The unreasonable 
searches of innocent people’s DNA profiles will no longer occur because the 
samples and accompanying profiles will have been destroyed. 
C.  Proposed Statutory Language 
The following are the proposed revisions to Ohio’s current all-arrestee DNA 
statute:319  
(F) Any person who is required to submit to a DNA specimen collection 
procedure under division (B)(1) of this section, who is acquitted, has the 
charges against them dropped, dismissed, or is exonerated in any manner 
will have their DNA sample and profile automatically expunged from any 
database pursuant to the procedures of the Automatic DNA Expungement 
Act.320  
(G) Any person who is required to submit a DNA specimen under 
division (B)(2)-(4) but is later exonerated of the charge and has no 
other charges that would require them to submit a DNA specimen, will 
have their DNA sample and profile automatically expunged from any 
database pursuant to the procedures of the Automatic DNA 
Expungement Act.321 
The language of the Automatic DNA Expungement Act is as follows: “The 
Automatic DNA Expungement Act’s purpose is to ensure that Ohio’s DNA 
samples and the resulting searches of them are done in a manner that is 
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 14 of the Ohio 
Constitution.”322  
(A) As used in this section: 
(1) “Acquittal” means being found not guilty of the charged offense 
(2) “Dismissal of charges” means that the person is no longer being 
charged with the offense of arrest.  
(3) “Exoneration” means the reversal of a guilty conviction upon 
appeal, not to include pardons, or clemency, not to include remanding 
for a new trial, parol,  or any other type of early release programs. 
                                                           
 319 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012) (corresponding headings to the 
actual statute). 
 320 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2012) (sampling from all felony 
arrestees). 
 321 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07(B)(2)-(4) (LexisNexis 2012) (explaining the process 
of sampling from convicted offenders). 
 322 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 299C.105 Subd. 3 (2012); MO. REV. STAT. § 650.055(11) 
(2012).  The basic framework of automatically destroying DNA samples is similar to the 
Minnesota and Missouri statutes; however, the proposed changes require a stricter 
expungement process and explain some of the procedure in greater detail. 
35Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
564 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:529 
(4) “DNA,” “DNA analysis,” “DNA specimen,” “DNA database,” and 
“DNA record” have the same meanings as in section 109.573 of the 
Revised Code.323 
(B)(1) Upon the dismissal of charges, acquittal or any other means of 
exoneration from a person arrested or indicted for a felony the arresting 
law enforcement agency, or dismissing court will notify the Bureau of 
Criminal Identification and Investigation that the person DNA specimen 
and accompany profile is to be automatically expunged.   
(2) Upon the exoneration of any convicted felon for any reason, the 
reversing court will notify the Bureau of Criminal Identification and 
Investigation of the person’s exoneration and the Bureau of Criminal 
Identification and Investigation will automatically expunge the 
person’s DNA specimen and accompany profile. 
(C)(1) The Bureau of Criminal Investigation and Identification must 
destroy the DNA specimen, the DNA record and any accompanying 
identification records. 
(2) The Bureau of Criminal Investigation and Identification will have 
15 days to destroy the DNA specimen and DNA record.  Upon the 
completion of the automatic expungement process the Bureau of 
Criminal Investigation and Identification will notify the samplee in 
writing that his or her DNA record has been expunged. 
(3) The Director of the Bureau of Criminal Investigation and 
Identification may prescribe rules for the efficient expungement of 
DNA specimen and DNA records in accordance with Chapter 119 of 
the Revised Code.  
(D) This section does not preclude the admissibility of any DNA matches 
or other evidence linked to a DNA sample match while the DNA 
specimen was lawfully contained in a DNA database at the time the 
analysis was conducted.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
Courts have begun a slow and steady march towards permitting the inclusion of 
DNA samples from anyone arrested for any offense.  The proposed creation of a new 
warrant exception, the expansion of the special needs doctrine, or the legislative 
revision of statutes to delay the implementation are in stark contrast to precedent 
                                                           
 323 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.573(A) (LexisNexis 2012).  The pertinent definitions 
are: 
(A) As used in this section: (1) “DNA” means human deoxyribonucleic acid.  (2) 
“DNA analysis” means a laboratory analysis of a DNA specimen to identify 
DNA characteristics and to create a DNA record.  (3) “DNA database” means a 
collection of DNA records from forensic casework or from crime scenes, 
specimens from anonymous and unidentified sources, and records collected 
pursuant to sections 2152.74 and 2901.07 of the Revised Code and a population 
statistics database for determining the frequency of occurrence of characteristics 
in DNA records.  (4) “DNA record” means the objective result of a DNA 
specimen, including representations of DNA fragments lengths, digital images of 
autoradiographs, discrete allele assignment numbers, and other DNA specimen 
characteristics that aid in establishing the identity of an individual.  (5) “DNA 
specimen” includes human blood cells or physiological tissues or body fluids. 
36https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss2/9
2013] STRIKING A BALANCE 565 
 
dealing with these issues.  Until the Supreme Court decides how much protection the 
Fourth Amendment guarantees in the area of DNA sampling, Ohio’s best recourse is 
to revise its current DNA collection scheme with the addition of an automatic 
expungement procedure.   
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